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We present an overview of our approach to managing security as a dimension of Quality of Service.
Relative to traditional QoS attributes (e.g., jitter, deadline, latency) security has been handled rather
statically and indirectly.  We have developed a theory of Quality of Security Service and a related
security-costing framework that supports extension of QoSS functionality to embrace existing and
emerging security technologies.  Our goals have been to leverage existing security mechanisms to
improve availability, predictability, and efficiency, while maintaining, if not increasing security of the
distributed system.
Variability in user and application security requirements allows the underlying control system to be
more adaptable in responding to requests for resources, and variability in system and resource security
requirements allows the distributed system, e.g., through quality of service (QoS) middleware, to offer
security choices to users or applications. The availability of user security choices along with support for
management of security resources in response to user requests enables quality of security service (QoSS).
We have found that many existing mechanisms and policies allow for security variance.  For example
MAC and DAC allow for whole sets of solutions via their “dominance” and set inclusion relationships,
and many so-called fixed requirements can be seen to actually define only minimums, allowing for a
range of solutions.  Some examples of security service attributes that provide ranges are the choice of
cryptographic algorithm, number of rounds or key length, assurance level or strength of boundary control
in a remote environment, or even the capability level of the environment’s security administrators.
QoS can be seen as the modulation of resources to deliver requested services to users, which depends
on the control and variability of resources. Similarly, QoSS involves the modulation of security resources,
and depends on the control and variability of those security resources.  In a typical distributed system, the
security restrictions and requirements confronted by a user emanate from many layers, components and
services. How can QoS or resource management middleware make sense out of this apparent chaos in
attempting to manage the system efficiently?  Our approach involves several abstractions:  the first is to
view all security restrictions as service attributes.  The second is to view all security restrictions as a range
that defines a set of partially ordered possibilities, where some values are “more secure” than others.  Of
course, in some cases the range is degenerate, meaning the related service can be used in only one way.
To understand how these ranges can be used in a layered distributed architecture, consider how a
request for execution of a task is passed between different layers, and security services are provided in
response to these requests.  As this task sequence is processed, there are both choices and limits regarding
each security restriction or requirement.  A choice is the security range request passed to the next layer.
A limit defines which requests from previous layers are acceptable.  In the end, if the task is realized by
the system, meaning that the various choices and limits have been successfully processed, the user’s
expectations for quality of security service will have been met.  Additionally, the QoS middleware will
have had additional latitude, by way of variant security requirements, in fulfilling user and system-wide
goals, thereby potentially increasing the availability, predictability, and efficiency of the system.
We have developed a prototype demonstration for the QoSS management of a low-level security
service, IPsec.  In this demonstration, a high level interface captures changes to the security posture of the
network and passes that information to a customized IPsec policy module. IPsec dynamically adjusts its
low-level security settings to the new security posture.  A second demonstration shows how complex sets
of IPsec security settings can be formulated through a visual XML security policy editor.
